Medieval Iceland and Modern Legal Scholarship by Posner, Richard A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 6 
1992 
Medieval Iceland and Modern Legal Scholarship 
Richard A. Posner 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, 
and the Legal History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard A. Posner, Medieval Iceland and Modern Legal Scholarship, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1495 (1992). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol90/iss6/24 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MEDIEVAL ICELAND AND MODERN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 
Richard A. Posner* 
BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN 
SAGA ICELAND. By William Ian Miller. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press. 1990. Pp. xii, 407. $29.95. 
I 
Professor William Miller of the University of Michigan Law 
School has written a learned and lively book on the society of medieval 
Iceland, with special reference to its methods of dispute resolution. 
He has written the book for two audiences. One consists of the tiny 
handful of specialists in medieval Iceland; the other of social histori-
ans, academic lawyers, political scientists, and other social scientists 
interested in dispute resolution and in social control more generally 
(including the foundations of the state). For the second group, the 
relative simplicity - political, social, and religious - of medieval Ice-
landic society lends fascination to the social institutions found in it 
because they are, as it were, observed under laboratory conditions. 
I am a member of Professor Miller's second audience, and so will 
not try to evaluate the accuracy of his scholarship. I have no reason to 
question it. I read the two books of Icelandic scholarship listed in 
Miller's bibliography that seemed most like his book, 1 and a compari-
son of those two books with Miller's does not suggest, at least to this 
outsider, that Miller's scholarship is in any way deficient. His book is 
longer and more detailed than either of the others and contains as 
impressive a bibliography. 
Miller's concern is with the period (A.D. 930-1262) in which medi-
eval Iceland was independent. It is this period - between the settle-
ment of Iceland (primarily by Norwegians) and the submission of the 
country to the King of Norway - that is depicted in the sagas, which 
are our main source of knowledge of medieval Iceland although there 
• Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chi-
cago Law School. - Ed. I thank David Cohen, Thrinn Eggertsson, David Friedman, Lawrence 
Lessig, and Andrew Schapiro for their very helpful comments on a previous draft. 
1. JESSE L.·BYOCK, FEUD IN THE ICELANDIC SAGA (1982); JESSEL. BYOCK, MEDIEVAL 
ICELAND: SOCIETY, SAGAS, AND POWER (1988) [hereinafter BYOCK, MEDIEVAL ICELAND]. 
Byock, a historian, specializes in and has published a number of articles on medieval Iceland, 
besides the two books. A recent addition to the pertinent literature is Henry Ordower, Exploring 
the Literary Function of Law and Litigation in Njal's Saga, 3 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 41 
(1991). 
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are also law codes and other miscellaneous writings and some archaeo-
logical remains. Those of us who remember the television series 
Monty Python's Flying Circus recall saga Iceland as a bleak, feature-
less, monotonous land of drably accoutered and colorless people 
whose names are strange without being charming - recall it indeed as 
the quintessence of the dull. Professor Miller has succeeded in dispel-
ling this impression by the liveliness of his style and the infectiousness 
of his own enthusiasm for his subject. That success is a tour de force 
in itself, for apart from, but of course not unrelated to, the unforgiving 
land and, as a consequence, sparse population, medieval Iceland 
lacked everything that made the Middle Ages so colorful a period in 
Western history. Iceland had no king, court, or nobility; feudalism 
was at best nascent, which is not to say that the society was egalita-
rian, for some men were considerably more powerful than others and 
some indeed were little better than slaves - some were slaves.2 The 
Catholic Church was much weaker than in Europe - so weak that for 
much of the period of independence it was forced to adopt a policy of 
peaceful coexistence with paganism.3 There were no Jews or heretics. 
Art, architecture, music, ornament, and decor were nonexistent or ru-
dimentary. There were no wars, no armies, no jousts, no chivalry, no 
courtly love, no philosophy or theology, no theater, and no literature 
other than the rather matter-of-fact sagas.4 There were no cities, no 
towns or even villages. There were no stone buildings. It was a simple 
pastoral culture. 
But of course it is the very simplicity of saga Iceland, a simplicity 
almost (though not quite, as we shall see) unique in Western history, 
that is the fascination - in particular its political simplicity. It was 
not quite a stateless society; nor is a stateless society apolitical; but the 
Icelandic state was weaker than the weakest night-watchman state. 
The formal institutions of government consisted of courts and an as-
sembly, which, like the ancient Athenian courts and assembly, were 
staffed by ordinary citizens rather than by professionals. There were 
no professionals, though there were law experts who in retrospect can 
be seen as proto-professional; in effect there were jurors but no judges 
2. And this at a time when slavery had all but disappeared from Europe. 
3. An unfortunate omission in Miller's book is that the nature of Icelandic paganism is no-
where explained; the index entry for "religion" merely refers the reader to the entry for 
"Church." The omission is repaired in BYOCK, MEDIEVAL ICELAND, supra note 1, at 137-64. 
4. Professor Milter's translations make them downright prosaic, probably unfairly to the sa-
gas' authors because I am informed on good authority that the prose style of the sagas - in their 
original Icelandic, of course - is elegant, and modem in its precision and brevity. Milter might 
reply that he is trying to be accurate rather than artistic. Yet when he has a saga character say, 
"To tell the truth, I could care less if they do each other as much harm as they wish" (p. 259), he 
makes it hard for the reader to believe that one is dealing with the peers of Homer. (The Penguin 
translation is a little better: ''To tell you the truth, they can do one another as much harm as 
they please for all I care." LAXD.IELA SAGA 173 (Magnus Magnusson & Hermann Palsson 
trans., 1969)). Although Miller praises the sagas for their subtlety of characterization, it cannot 
be said that he inspires a desire to read them. 
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(hence no appeals). The speaker of the assembly was the only salaried 
official in Iceland. There was plenty of death, including much chop-
ping off of heads with axes, but at least there were no taxes (or virtu-
ally none: the speaker was paid out of the marriage fee). There was, 
crucially, no executive arm of government and as a result there were 
no sheriffs, no police, no soldiers, and no prosecutors. All suits, in-
cluding criminal suits, were prosecuted by private individuals, and, 
what was the greater innovation in the art of minimizing government 
(for a number of societies that no one would call stateless have left 
prosecution even of criminal cases to private individuals5), all judicial 
decrees were enforced privately, if at all. 
Adjudication was not the only lawful method of resolving disputes. 
The feud was lawful, too, and so (less surprisingly) was private arbitra-
tion, in which a dispute was submitted for binding resolution to one or 
more men selected by the disputants. Family was extremely impor-
tant. Because people looked to both near and remote relatives for aid 
in enforcing decrees and conducting feuds, concepts of kinship were 
more elaborate and refined than in modem society. Power was impor-
tant too. Powerful men were chieftains, to whom lesser men rendered 
services in exchange for support and protection. Here was the germ of 
a feudal system; but the elaboration of feudal duties, ranks, and obliga-
tions that we find in medieval Europe was missing. Moreover, chief-
tainships could be sold - an intrusion of the market that a true 
feudalist would consider horrifying. 
Icelanders were great amateur lawyers and their law codes were as 
complex and ingenious as most of the rest of their culture was simple 
and monotonous. Njal, the hero of the best-known saga, was one of 
these amateur lawyers. The procedures for finding facts were more 
rational than those in force in most medieval societies, for little reli-
ance was placed on supernatural methods. Yet the system was sur-
prisingly inflexible on the remedial side. The only sanctions that the 
Icelandic courts meted out, other than for the most trivial infractions 
(which were punished by a fixed fine), were outlawry and lesser out-
lawry. Outlawry made a man an outlaw in the literal sense: anyone 
could kill him with impunity. Lesser outlawry meant banishment 
from Iceland for three years. The inflexible character of the legal rem-
edies made arbitration attractive, since arbitrators could impose fines 
or fashion what we would call equitable decrees, tailored to the partic-
ular circumstances of the case. Refusal to obey an arbitral decree was 
punishable like other serious wrongdoing. 
This strikingly decentralized system of governance survived for 
more than three centuries. No one knows just how much violence 
there was, but the society was not anarchic, though the institutional 
structure sketched above might seem a recipe for anarchy. Nor did 
5. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 237-40 (1978). 
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saga Iceland lapse into tyranny, despite the apparent fragility of its 
institutions. Even feuds were governed by norms (for example, that 
the killing of an outlaw should not be revenged - should not, that is, 
occasion a feud) that despite the absence of formal sanctions were 
obeyed with some, though far from complete, regularity. 
All this - the system of law and order in medieval Iceland and its 
ancillary institutions such as kinship - Professor Miller sets forth 
with admirable clarity and also with a wealth of detail, meanwhile 
judiciously separating fact from fiction in the saga accounts and lu-
cidly recounting from the sagas numerous disputes and their resolu-
tion by feud, litigation, or arbitration. The greatest strength of the 
book is its description of the structure and, above all, the actual opera-
tion of medieval Icelandic institutions. Although Miller's focus is on 
dispute resolution, much of the book quite properly is devoted to 
describing the social background out of which disputes arose and 
against which they were resolved, including the system for the ex-
change or transfer of goods (through gift exchange, sale, or raid), the 
subject of a superb chapter (Chapter Three). The second audience of 
which I spoke at the outset can hardly be assumed to be conversant 
with the structure of Icelandic kinship, yet that structure is basic to an 
understanding of the operation of the feud, the lawsuit, and arbitra-
tion, and so receives a chapter too (Chapter Five). It is basic because 
none of the methods of dispute resolution could be implemented effec-
tively without rallying potential supporters, and the principles of kin-
ship were vital in determining who your potential supporters were and 
also whom among your potential opponents you might neutralize on 
grounds of kinship (pp. 164-67). 
Miller's former vocation as a professor of literature stands him in 
good stead as he teases out the implications of the saga texts that are 
the principal data for his analysis, while his present vocation as a law 
professor may account for the superior crispness and authority of his 
description of the Icelandic legal process (Chapter Seven), compared 
to Byock's. 6 The only fault I have to find at the level of description, of 
narrative, as distinct from the level of analysis, is with the clumsiness 
of Professor Miller's scholarly apparatus; and it is with this point, pa-
rochial or even pedantic as it might appear to be, that I begin my 
critique. 
II 
Miller has, as I have said, two audiences. His method of trying to 
satisfy the demands of the first, the specialist audience, for documenta-
tion without losing the rest of us to tedium is inept. It consists of 
combining the "scientific" method of citing references - that is, citing 
6. See sources cited in note l, supra. 
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them in the text itself (or in the endnotes) by the author's last name 
and the date of publication and giving the full citation information in a 
bibliography at the end of the book - with long textual endnotes 
(sixty-three pages of small print, compared to a text of 308 pages). So 
there are really three texts: the text itself, studded with bibliographi-
cal references and endnote call numbers; the bibliography; and the 
endnotes. Opening the book at random, I find myself on page 224, 
where in the middle paragraph I spot endnote call number nine. I go 
to the back of the book and flip through the notes until I find note nine 
to page 224, and there I find a reference to page 144, to which I repair 
only to find another endnote call number, which sends me to a note 
that contains bibliographical references in scientific form and therefore 
propels me to the bibliography. Who can read a book this way? 
Maybe medieval Icelandic studies is such a quiet field that an Ice-
landic scholar would be refreshed to encounter a book in his field com-
posed a la mode Derrida, but it turns out that many of the endnotes 
and many of the bibliographical references in both the (main) text and 
the endnotes are directed at the second audience, the general scholarly 
audience. The last two endnotes in the book are to game theory and to 
the comparative study of revenge, respectively, rather than to anything 
Icelandic. They contain three citations and so send one hopping to the 
bibliography again. 
The scientific system of citation is designed for short papers with a 
handful of references; you can remember the names as you read, and 
when you get to the end you can see at a glance what works the author 
is building from and make a note of any work you want to look up. 
The system makes no sense for a long book with a bibliography of (at a 
rough count) almost four hundred separate works. 
My bigger gripe is the endnotes. I have not yet read a book in 
which I thought it made sense to, put the notes at the end of the book 
rather than at the bottom of the pages. It is too great an interruption 
to be constantly turning to the back of the book. How much of an 
interruption depends on the number and length of the notes. Miller's 
book has more than four hundred notes, which means an average of 
more than one per page of text or, more vividly, means that the consci-
entious reader will be turning to the back of the book four hundred 
times before he has finished. Once back there, as I said, he will often 
find himself flipping still farther back to' the bibliography before he 
returns to the main text. The notes aren't short either, for remember 
that most of the bibliographical informatjon is in the bibliography 
rather than in the initial citation; thus these are mainly textual notes. 
Four hundred notes in sixty-three pages means that each page of notes 
- pages in small print, be it noted - has on average fewer than seven 
notes, and that means that the average note is substantial. Some of 
them are a page or more in length, and by the time you've finished 
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reading one of these notes and returned to the text you've lost the 
thread of what you were reading. 
I can imagine, though I don't recall ever having actually seen, a 
book in which all the endnotes were (1) bibliographical and (2) in-
tended solely to provide research leads for specialists. And in such a 
book the endnote format wouldn't be troublesome. Miller's book is 
not of that character. The notes are a melange of bibliographical and 
textual, and many of the bibliographical notes supply not merely leads 
for further research but the sources and evidence for the cruces in 
Miller's argument. The careful reader, specialist or not, wants to see 
those notes as he reads. 
I have gone on at such length on this subject - at the risk of 
sounding like one of those cranky reviewers who complain about the 
size of typeface or the quality of the binding or the color of the dust 
jacket, or who count typographical errors - because the endnote is a 
rapidly growing plague of scholarly book publishing rather than just 
an idiosyncratic failing of Professor Miller and his publisher. He has 
made it even worse by combining it with the scientific method of cita-
tion (ironically, since, as we shall see, Miller is no friend of the appli-
cation of scientific method to the study of human society) and by the 
number, length, and heterogeneous character of the notes. 
Miller might reply that his notes and bibliography contain much 
useful information - which is true - and what was he to do with it? 
As footnotes with full bibliographical information, the notes would 
have taken up on average almost twenty percent of each page of the 
book. But it's a lot easier for the reader to glance to the bottom of the 
page and see whether a note is something he wants to read than to 
tum to the back of the book. And anyway the notes could and should 
have been pruned. Some of them are unnecessary; for example, the 
reader need hardly be told that the name of a saga character that 
Miller translates as "Sam" is not derived from the Hebrew "Samuel" 
(p. 353 n.27), especially since Samuel is not "Samuel" in Hebrew, it's 
Shmuel No one thinks the Icelanders are the lost tribe of Israel. 
Some notes continue the discussion in text and could have been inte-
grated into it. Some deal with recurrent issues relating to the texts of 
the Icelandic sagas and could have been consolidated and addressed in 
the introduction. 
It is easy when writing a scholarly piece to keep adding notes as 
new thoughts occur to one or as new sources come to one's attention. 
But at the end one should go back and interrogate every note care-
fully, asking: Is this a qualification or continuation or amplification of 
the text, and if so can it be worked into the text so that the flow of 
discussion is not broken? Is it a minor point that can be dropped with-
out impairing the integrity of the work? Can it be consolidated with 
another note? Had Professor Miller undertaken such a regimen, and, 
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having drastically reduced the number and length of his notes, placed 
the survivors at the bottom of the pages where they belong, he would 
have produced an even more readable work than he has. 
III 
A more serious problem with Bloodtaking and Peacemaking is the 
book's relation to theory. The book is at once too theoretical and not 
theoretical enough. It is too theoretical in that it gestures toward two 
largely useless (for Miller's proper purposes) bodies of theory that 
happen to overlap. The result is some bad patches of jargon, some 
laboring of the obvious, and some superfluous bows to the norm of 
political correctness for which his university is notorious. 7 One of the 
bodies of theory is the historical and, particularly, the anthropological 
literature on dispute resolution, and it is indeed a mine of interesting 
information about societies that resemble medieval Iceland in the 
weakness of their state institutions and resulting emphasis on substi-
tute institutions such as the feud and arbitration; but the literature in 
question is for the most part a- or pretheoretical, occasionally ventur-
ing interesting generalizations but usually emphasizing the uniqueness 
of the particular society under consideration. (Anthropologists, like 
historians, have a vested interest in the particularity of the individual 
culture that they have taken such pains to understand.) General 
knowledge is not the only knowledge, even if you don't agtee with 
William Blake's dictum that to generalize is to be an idiot. But knowl-
edge without an organizing theory is difficult to deploy, and Miller 
seems stumped by what to do with the anthropological and historical 
parallels that he has found. 
The second body of theory that Miller invokes, albeit sparingly, is 
the discourse of "postmodernism" in its aspect of critique of the En-
lightenment - and hence of functionalism, economics, and other sci-
entific or at least systematic approaches to the understanding of 
society. Postmodernism derides objectivity, observer independence, 
the mutual intelligibility or intertranslatability of different cultures, 
the transparency of thought to language, the idea of progress, and 
other alleged presuppositions of W estem thought. The world is a text, 
to be interpreted rather than deciphered, "interpretation" being un-
derstood as (at best) the forcible imposition of meaning by individuals 
trapped in their subjectivity, their ethnocentrism. Abstraction kills. 
Our only hope of understanding is through the making of ever 
"thicker" descriptions. Postmodernism maintains an unbroken vigil 
for signs of racism, sexism, and ethnocentrism, particularly when the 
7. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (invalidat-
ing, because too broad and too vague, the University of Michigan's regulation of hate speech and 
other forms of discriminatory harassment). 
1502 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1495 
oppressor race is white, the oppressor sex male, the oppressor ethnos 
Western. 
I am being pretty derisive myself, and in my soberer moods I ac-
knowledge that we have something to learn from postmodernism (and 
of course from history and anthropology - two fields, by the way, 
deeply invaded by postmodernism), that there is, in short, knowledge 
besides scientific knowledge. But it isn't easy to maintain this judi-
cious approach in the face of Miller's employment of postmodernism. 
All he seems to !lave gotten out of it is an unpleasant and unhelpful, 
though happily very intermittent, jargon; a desire to dress common 
sense in the language of theory, in other words to mystify common 
sense; a conviction that the world is a very complicated and mysteri-
ous place resistant to comparative study aimed at uncovering regulari-
ties and constants analogous to those found by science in nature; and a 
fear of being thought judgmental. 
Such phrases or propositions in Miller's book as "the negotiability 
of significations" (p. 3), "[t]he philology of residence" (p. 115), 
"[f]ostering was the social construct within which the circulation of 
children was comprehended" (p. 123), kinship was "an organizing 
metaphor" (p. 154), "[t]he balanced-exchange model, to give it a 
name, served as a kind of constitutive metaphor" (p. 184), "[p]ower is 
a difficult concept, at least since Foucault made it one" (p. 245), 
"power did indeed have a strong discursive component" (p. 246), and 
"[c]an the 'private' as an analytic category exist unless it is paired with 
and distinguished from 'public?' " (p. 305) show how the post-
modernist style can lead an author away from clear-headed analysis of 
social institutions and into a terminological miasma. 
In the last quotation Professor Miller is trying to save his Ice-
landers from the clutches of the libertarians, who admire the privatiza-
tion of law enforcement and find it exemplified in the society depicted 
in the sagas.8 However, the idea that "private" is not a meaningful 
term in a society without a "public" sector is, unless amplified, non-
sense parading as paradox. The libertarian point is after all a simple 
though potentially misleading one: that the history of Iceland shows 
that a society can maintain some minimum of law and order without 
having what we would consider the minimum condition for law and 
order - a governmental monopoly of force. Medieval Iceland had 
barely any government, and what government it did have had no mo-
nopoly of force. The point is not touched by Miller's rhetorical ques-
tion. Maybe what he means, however, is that if there is no coercive 
government in a society, there will be other coercive institutions to 
take its place, and these - a numbing traditionalism, perhaps, or in-
timidation by grandees - may curtail liberty just as much as does a 
8. Actually, one libertarian. See David Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: 
A Historical Case, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1979). 
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modern social-welfare state, the libertarian's bete noire. That would 
be a valid and important point. Hit's Miller's point, I wish he'd say 
so. 
An earlier entry in my litany of quotations illustrates, once its con-
text is restored, Miller's tendency to wrap a simple and correct, some-
times even an obvious, point in postmodernist cotton: "Because power 
was so intimately linked with reputation and specifically with the rep-
utation for having power (that is, power did indeed have a strong dis-
cursive component), its loss, was often gradual, requiring both a slow 
cumulation of discomfitures and a consequent community reassess-
ment of one's standing relative to others" (p. 246). This is an obscure 
and plethoric way of saying that political power, being latent force, 
will often persist after the actual willingness or ability to apply force 
has ceased, because it will take time for knowledge of that cessation to 
filter out. The United States could continue to exert power over other 
countries for quite a time after its officials secretly agreed never again 
to employ force in aid of foreign policy. 
Readers of this review who are familiar with my writings in the 
economics of law may think my criticism of Miller's jargon is a case of 
the pot calling the kettle black. I admit that economics has a jargon, 
that the jargon is overused (I hope not by me), and that it is exces-
sively mathematized (surely not by me, for I lack the capacity to in-
dulge in that particular vice). There is a difference. The distinctive 
language of economics consists of defined terms, such as quasi-rents 
and marginal cost and marginal utility and Pareto superiority and com-
parative advantage and consumer surplus and elasticity of demand with 
respect to income, and the definitions are precise. The distinctive lan-
guage of postmodernism does not consist of defined terms, is evocative 
rather than precise, imparts no economy of expression, and if on occa-
sion it has a certain quasi-poetic charm - the sort of thing that initi-
ates find in Heidegger - Miller's book is not one of those occasions. 
Some of Miller's points may not be worth making at all, as distinct 
from being made clearly. For example, he tells us that "[l]aw never 
eschews violence either in early Iceland or in modern industrial soci-
ety" (p. 232). That is true, because it is always possible that force may 
have to be used to compel obedience to a legal judgment, and physical 
force exerted against a resisting organism is violence. It does not fol-
low, however, as Miller appears to believe, that in a comparison of 
early Iceland to modern us, there really isn't that much to choose be-
tween on the score of law and order. In his conclusion, worrying the 
question whether Iceland was a more or a less violent society than 
ours is, Miller returns to the role of force in a modern legal system and 
asks whether saga Iceland merely seems violent in comparison to our 
society because of 
the fear and anxiety we imagine we would feel at the prospect of having 
no state to enforce our rights for us or to protect us from those bent on 
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enforcing their own? In other words, does their culture seem more vio-
lent because the responsibility for actually doing acts of violence was 
more evenly distributed than it is now, there being no state agents to 
delegate the dirty work to or to claim a monopoly on the dirty work? [p. 
304] 
These questions suggest that a bloodfeud society merely makes trans-
parent the conditions of our own society. In the same vein Miller says· 
elsewhere that "there was no state apparatus to disguise better the 
relationship between the power of the parties and control of legal pro-
cess" (p. 256), that "[t]he sagas do not show people continually living 
with the anticipation of violence, rape, or expropriation that many 
American urban dwellers must live with daily" (p. 304), and that 
"[e]arly state formation, I would guess, surely tended to involve redis-
tributions, not from rich to poor, however, but from poor to rich, from 
weak to strong" (p. 306). The qualifications ("early,'' "I would 
guess") should be noted, but the flavor of his discussion is that the 
modem state, including the modem states of the West - including the 
United States - may not be much of an improvement on an Iceland-
style bloodfeud culture (with slavery) other than in the disguise 
and the mystification of power the more effectively to exploit the 
powerless. 
Miller's own account of Icelandic society belies this attack upon 
the idea of progress. A lot of bystanders (granted, not all are inno-
cent) get killed in these feuds; a lot of pawns get sacrificed. "Gunnar 
and Njal are substantial householders; they are neighbors and good 
friends. Their wives, however, have been bitter enemies ever since a 
quarrel over seating arrangements at a feast. Insults were exchanged 
there and over the course of the next few years so were killings of 
slaves and servants" (p. 284). When Gunnar and Njal are off together, 
Gunnar's wife takes the opportunity to send a member of her house-
hold to kill a servant of Njal's household. Miller then describes how, 
to preserve their friendship, Njal accepted a cash settlement from 
Gunnar. "The darker side of Gunnar and Njal's settlement is that it 
was little more than a symbol of peace, a formalized reaffirmation of 
their friendship. Their wives, Bergthora and Hallgerd, the real dispu-
tants, continued to fight; within a year Brynjolf [the killer of Njal's 
servant] was dead at Bergthora's [Njal's wife's] bidding" (p. 289). 
At the risk of being labeled ethnocentric - a risk to anyone who 
suggests that the West may have progressed in the last one thousand 
years other than in techniques of oppression - I suggest that we have 
come a long way in domestic dispute resolution since Njal's day. If 
Miller wanted to refrain from making any normative judgments, that 
would be fine by me. But, particularly in his concluding chapter, he 
seems to be doing something else - burnishing his postmodernist cre-
dentials, establishing his political inoffensiveness, by denying that any-
thing in his book should be thought to give aid and comfort to 
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libertarians, or to whiggish liberals, and even trying to redeem medie-
val Iceland for feminism by pointing out that the status of women was 
somewhat higher there than elsewhere in medieval Europe (p. 305). 
I said Miller was "gesturing" in the direction of the historical and 
anthropological literature on dispute resolution and the postmodernist 
critique of W estem thought, by which I meant to suggest that these 
bodies of theory play only an incidental role in his book. He plainly 
doesn't believe in the unintelligibility of other cultures. But the ges-
tures have two bad effects. One is to complicate what is after all the 
simple and straightforward account that Miller wants to give us. The 
other is to deflect him from other scholarly approaches that might 
have helped him to tell an even more interesting story. 
IV 
The heart of the book is an account of how people keep greed and 
violence within bounds despite the absence of a state security appara-
tus. The essential restraining device is the threat of retaliatory vio-
lence by the potential victim,9 but to be a fully credible deterrent it 
requires that the victim have allies of some sort - otherwise there 
would be no (or yery little) deterrent to murder. Hence the impor-
tance not only of kinship, but, as Miller also emphasizes, of rhetoric. 
Even kin may be reluctant to risk their necks on your behalf, so you 
have to be able to persuade (not prove: the factfinding procedures 
were not that developed). That is, you must be able to put the offender 
in the wrong in their eyes and demonstrate the importance of retalia-
tion to the future security of the kin group. Kinship has a double 
(actually triple, as we shall see) significance in a system of revenge; it 
expands not only the ranks of the potential violators but also the range 
of potential targets. If X kills Y, Y's family may decide to go after X's 
brother rather than after X himself - maybe the brother is not as well 
protected as X. In other words, responsibility is collective ("joint and 
several," as the lawyers say); this in tum gives people an incentive to 
police their kin, lest a kinsman's misbehavior lead to retaliation 
against them rather than just against him. Miller also stresses, as have 
many other writers on feuds, the importance of a sense of honor. 
Shame, the reaction to being dishonored, helps overcome fear, making 
it more likely that a victim W,ill retaliate if attacked or abused - and if 
he doesn't retaliate he will be easy game and the system of revenge will 
fail to keep the peace. Hence the importance of keeping score and the 
connection of the sense of honor with notions of exchange, balance, 
and reciprocity. 
The difficulty with an economy of threats is that it is likely to be 
highly unstable, although there are counterexamples such as the nu-
9. "The continuance of good relations was assisted greatly by the fear of feud." P. 187. 
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clear balance of terror. Deterrence rarely works perfectly, so there 
will be some misconduct and therefore some retaliation, and each act 
of retaliation may be perceived by the original aggressor, or by his kin, 
as an act of aggression inciting retaliation against the retaliator. The 
feud is born, and it can spiral out of control. The incentive to form a 
group powerful enough to deter retaliation is therefore strong, and the 
competition to form such groups may result in a monopoly of force 
after all, and hence in the formation of a state. That this did not hap-
pen in Iceland for three centuries suggests that the Icelanders must 
have had norms or institutions that played the same role in the blood-
feud system as graphite rods play in the core of a nuclear reactor: to 
slow down the chain reaction. 
One was law. Legal judgments were not self-executing, and if the 
·convicted defendant thumbed his nose at a judgment the plaintiff 
would have to rally his kin to enforce the judgment by force, much as 
if he had decided to retaliate directly against the defendant for 
whatever wrong had touched off their dispute. But, as Miller explains, 
a legal judgment might have enough suasive force to make it easier for 
the plaintiff to rally his allies and also easier for the defendant's poten-
tial allies to beg off, thus tending to isolate the defendant and so vindi-
cating the plaintiff's decision to go to law rather than to fight (pp. 238-
39). Miller also notes that the bilateral character of Icelandic kinship 
(Icelanders reckoned kinship through both the father and the mother, 
whereas in many societies kinship is figured only through the father 
and in a few only through the mother) made it more likely that a 
disputant would have kin on both sides of the dispute, and these kin 
caught in the middle were naturals to try to make peace between the 
disputants (p. 265). Arbitration was another method of mitigating the 
ferocity of feuds, although its utility, like that of law, was limited by 
the fact that a man who seemed too willing to litigate or compromise 
his disputes might get a reputation for being afraid to fight - might, 
thus, lose honor, and by doing so invite future aggression against 
himself. 
Miller describes well this basic logic of a stable revenge system 
(stable in the sense that it doesn't either explode into anarchy or col-
lapse into tyranny) and offers many illuminating illustrations of its op-
eration, emphasizing the subtle rhetorical and strategic skills required 
to maneuver effectively in such a society as well as the norms and 
institutiqns that secured its stability. So far, so good. But I think he 
could have further enlarged our understanding of the Icelandic sys-
tem, and of the problem of social order generally, with a more eclectic 
research strategy. 
The legal system that Miller describes resembles that of classical 
Athens. There prosecutions even for such serious crimes as murder 
and treason were initiated and conducted by private persons ("de-
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nouncers") and tried before panels of citizens chosen at random. 
There were no professional judges and no appeals. There were no law-
yers as such, though orators such as Demosthenes hired themselves 
out to assist the litigants. Enforcement of judgments was by public 
officers, unlike the situation in Iceland; the panels of jurors were 
larger; and there were other differences between the two systems. But 
the parallels are striking - they include the heavy use of banishment 
as a sanction and a propensity to protracted and repetitive litigation by 
"feuding" factions - and there is an extensive literature on the opera-
tion of the Athenian system, including the role of forensic oratory, 
that Miller could have consulted with profit.10 
The ancient Greek society that most resembles saga Iceland, how-
ever, is not Athens; it is the society depicted in the Homeric epics. 
(And there is the same problem, as in the sagas, of disentangling fact 
from fiction in works of imaginative literature.) Homeric society11 has 
only rudimentary governmental institutions, and exhibits the same 
emphasis that we find in the sagas on revenge as the principle of social 
order. Some years ago I tried to extract the basic system of social 
order from the Homeric epics much as Miller does with the sagas.12 
But my approach to revenge, the feud, and related institutions and 
practices differs from Miller's in emphasizing the utility of economics 
as a tool for understanding the operation of a revenge system.13 Eco-
nomics is also the approach used by David Friedman in his article on 
Iceland.14 Recently- too late (I assume) for Miller to have seen the 
work- an Icelandic economist has chimed in with an interesting ex-
planation for the stability of saga Iceland's system of governance.15 
There is an economic literature on other "stateless" regimes that have 
managed to maintain a modicum at least of social order, such as the 
mining communities that sprang up during the California Gold Rush 
at a time and in a place where government authority was essentially 
nonexistent.16 
10. See, for example, 2 ROBERT J. BONNER & GERTRUDE SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO ARlsrOTLE (1938), other references in my book, RICHARD A. 
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 110 n.57 (1988), and 
THOMAS C. BRICKHOUSE & NICHOLAS D. SMITH, SOCRATES ON TRIAL (1989). 
11. By which I mean the society Homer depicted, not the society in w,hich Homer (or who-
ever the author or authors of the Homeric epics were) lived. 
12. Richard A. Posner, The Homeric Version of the Minimal State, 90 ETHICS 27 (1979), 
reprinted in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNOMICS OF JUSTICE 119 (1981). 
13. See also Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, reprinted 
in POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 207 and POSNER, supra note 10, at 25 
("Revenge as Legal Prototype and Literary Genre"). Recent work in the same vein includes 
Alan P. Hamlin, Rational Revenge, 101 ETHICS 374 (1991). 
14. See Friedman, supra note 8. Miller cites this article, but only to show that libertarians 
have taken an interest in Iceland; he does not disciiss it. 
15. THRINN EGGERTSSON, EcoNOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INsrITurIONS 305-10 (1990), dis-
cussed infra text accompanying note 17. 
16. See, e.g., ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
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Economists are interested in incentives and hence in deterrence, 
and Miller himself recognizes the centrality of these factors to the so-
cial system of saga Iceland. He puzzles over the relation between 
honor and feud, but quickly recognizes that the key is deterrence: 
"honor is the ability to make others believe that you will indeed be 
tough the next time" (p. 303). Economics provides a lens for seeing 
the forest rather than just the trees. Honor, feud, reputation, balance, 
exchange, reciprocity, legitimacy, power, rhetoric, and the other fea-
tures ·of medieval Iceland that Miller describes are complex, elusive, 
and nuanced phenomena. But they can also be seen in a simpler, less 
variegated, less impressionistic light. Remove the coercive state (or 
fail to institute it in a new society, as happened in Iceland), and people 
still want to eat, and live, and reproduce, and this results in the culti-
vation of attitudes, demeanors, and values that maximize survival 
(broadly defined) in the stateless setting by creating an equilibrium 
based on, but also limiting recourse to, threats of violence. All this is 
clear enough but perhaps thin; the challenge to the economist is to 
explain the differences in attitudes, demeanors, and so on, and result-
ing differences in norms and institutions, across stateless societies. 
The stabilizing and destabilizing features of a revenge system are 
particularly interesting because they explain why such a system lasts 
as long as it does last and why it collapses when it does. The system 
seems, as I have already suggested, inherently unstable because people 
have an incentive to form ever larger protective associations, whether 
based on kinship or on geographical propinquity, until at last one of 
them achieves a monopoly of force and the state is born. Economics 
helps us understand why this happened so slowly in Iceland. First, 
Iceland didn't have any significant foreign enemies - there were no 
threats of invasion until Norway began throwing its weight around 
toward the end. So the benefits of a large protective association were 
fewer than they otherwise would have been. Second, the country was 
very poor, which made it difficult for anyone to support an entourage 
of retainers, feudal-style, who in exchange for food and shelter would 
place an armed force at the disposal of their liege; lacking that armed 
force he had little to offer in the way of protection to other people in 
the society. This is to exaggerate some, since Iceland had chieftains, 
but the pitifully small forces at their disposal - a handful of relatives, 
dependents, and clients taking the afternoon off from farm work -
limited their power to the execution of piecemeal revenge. None was 
able to offer a king's peace to the entire society. 
In other words, a community needs an economic surplus to sup-
port specialists in coercion. Once the surplus appears, however, the 
stateless state's days are numbered. Eggertsson suggests that toward 
DISPUTES (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Professor David Friedman- Ed.); GARY D. LIDE-
CAP, CoNTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989). 
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the end of Icelandic independence the Church was able at last to col-
lect a heavy tax yet unable to keep the bulk of the revenues out of the 
coffers of a handful of major chieftains. Six of them grew to the point 
where they could and did engage in civil war on a respectable scale, at 
which point the population was happy to turn to the King of Norway 
for protection and Icelandic independence ended.17 
I mentioned Miller's penultimate endnote, in which he refers to 
game theory, the science of conflict and conflict resolution. He cites a 
single work by Robert Axelrod18 and explains that Axelrod had found 
in a series of computer games that the optimal strategy for achieving 
cooperation in a decentralized system is "tit for tat"; that is, if you act 
noncooperatively toward me, I'll retaliate in kind, but I won't escalate 
the retaliation. Miller gives Axelrod a polite brush off 19 but con-
cludes, "I am not a student of game theory, so the points I am making 
here may well have easy answers I do not know about" (p. 374). This 
won't do. Game theory is, as I said, the science of conflict and conflict 
resolution, so if you're going to write about that subject it behooves 
you to study the relevant science at least to the extent necessary to 
satisfy yourself that there is nothing in it that you can use. 20 Game 
theory can be forbiddingly mathematical, but it doesn't have to be, any 
more than economics has to be, and William Miller could learn the 
rudiments of game theory21 in a good deal less time than it took him to 
learn Old Icelandic. 
Equipped with these complementary bodies of knowledge that I 
have noted, Miller will be poised to make even more important contri-
butions to our understanding of law, Iceland, and social order in his 
future articles and books than he has made in the excellent book under 
review. And it is indeed excellent, though I have emphasized my areas 
of disagreement. And while making qualifications I should like to ac-
knowledge that social science is not the only route to the understand-
ing of human social behavior. Literature is another route, and the 
sagas are literature. But with all due respect for Professor Miller, he is 
not an author of literature, or even a translator of it; and though 
trained as a literary critic, he does not write as a literary critic. He 
writes as a social and legal historian, and in this role he could, I re-
spectfully suggest, benefit from widening his scholarly horizons. 
17. EGGERTSSON, supra note 15, at 309-10. 
18. ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CoOPERATION (1984). 
19. "Axelrod's analysis of computerized strategies for the Prisoner's Dilemma game is re-
markably suggestive, but does not seem to be readily applicable to the Icelandic feud without 
considerable qualification." P. 374. 
20. I say this who shouldn't, because I have written about conflict, too, without equipping 
myself with the rudiments of game theory. 
21. See generally ERIC RAsMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
GAME THEORY (1989). For pertinent applications to law, see ELLICKSON, supra note 16, at 296 
(index entry for "game theory"). 
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I end with a few comments on the genre of scholarship, and of 
scholar, to which this book and its author belong. In the brief period 
since Miller's book appeared, there have also appeared Professor El-
lickson's study of extralegal dispute settlement,22 Professor Grey's 
study of the poetry of Wallace Stevens,23 Professor Rosenberg's study 
of the effects of landmark legal cases,24 and Professor Cohen's study of 
the legal and moral regulation of sexuality in ancient Athens.25 Ellick-
son and Grey are law professors, Rosenberg is a political scientist, and 
Cohen, though law-trained, is the chairman of a department of rheto-
ric. These are all excellent books published by distinguished univer-
sity presses despite what might appear to the pedantic to be, in each 
case, a mismatch between the author's professional credentials and his 
subject matter. Miller's book exhibits the same phenomenon, for he is 
a law professor and an ex-English professor writing Icelandic social 
history (law is by no means the principal focus of the book). 
What is going on? This is the age of specialization. Were we not 
told by Max Weber almost a century ago that "[!]imitation to special-
ized work, with a renunciation of the Faustian universality of man 
which it involves, is a condition of any valuable work in the modem 
world"?26 
I think a number of things are going on: 
1. The academic-legal market for books other than textbooks is 
small, in part because law professors, being habituated to excellent li-
brary facilities, are not natural book buyers. As a result university 
presses, which generally do not publish textbooks, are reluctant to 
publish law books that do not spill over into other fields. So spillover 
books are overrepresented in these presses' law lists. 
2. Law teaching, because it is by academic standards well paid, 
undemanding, and noncompetitive, attracts a number of bright people 
whose true love is for a different subject. A fraction of these tum out 
to be highly motivated scholars despite their having an easy berth. 
3. Being subject rather than method, law is amenable to study by 
people in other disciplines, such as economics or political science or 
even literary criticism, or by lawyers employing the tools of those 
disciplines. 
22. See ELLICKSON, supra note 16. 
23. THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF PO· 
ETRY (1991). 
24. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CoURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Stephen L. Carter - Ed.). 
25. DAVID COHEN, LAW, SEXUALITY AND SOCIETY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS IN 
CLASSICAL ATHENS (1991). 
26. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 180 (Talcott 
Parsons trans., 1958). 
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4. Specialization begets a demand for generalists and interdis-
ciplinarians. The proliferation of arcane subspecialties creates a space 
for bridge builders and translators who will meld approaches or tum 
them to problems outside the research paths of the specialist practi-
tioners. Legal training is not the worst preparation for playing this 
role. 
5. Most important I think, the rapid progress of the social sciences 
in recent decades, and the increasing emphasis on theory in fields such 
as literature and history that had for so long resisted it, have multi-
plied the opportunities for bringing other fields besides law itself to 
bear upon law. The result is a growing and improving interdiscipli-
nary legal scholarship honorably represented by Bloodtaking and 
Peacemaking. 
